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Theory Psychology 2007; 17; 529

DOI: 10.1177/0959354307079303

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Rezoning Pleasure

Drives and Affects in Personality Theory

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ABSTRACT. Much contemporary psychological and psychoanalytic research embraces affects but deletes drives. Tomkins made specific place for both affects and drives in his theory, suggesting that much of interest arose from their conflict and co-assembly. This article explores why drives have been dismissed, and argues for their explanatory usefulness in an embodied science of personality. Possible advantages of Tomkins' affect theory over Freud's are discussed as a prelude to assembling (via Westen) a lean, mean, motivational model of personality development. The model combines a view of drives consonant with contemporary evidence and representative of the early Freud with a differential affect theory indebted to Silvan Tomkins. Applications of the model are explored using as case studies personality research on psychopathy and the role of shame in narcissism. The model explores the way that signature personality profiles emerge as developmental pathways are opened or closed due to affective idiosyncrasy.

KEY WORDS: affect, affective personality dispositions, drives, Machiavellianism, narcissism, personality, psychopathy, shame

Found Wanting

That we are not merely knowers but wanters is now well established within mainstream psychology (Baumeister, 1992; Westen, 1992); sometimes decisions are just too important for cognition and some now think we need affects to save us from our own intelligence (Griffiths, 1999). The Lazarus-Zajonc debate (Lazarus, 1984; Lazarus, Coyne, & Folkman, 1984; Zajonc, 1984a, 1984b) about the independence of affect from cognition is now well and truly resolved (Griffiths, 2003; Zajonc, 2001). The affect primacy thesis has been

shown as essentially correct: affect is not constituted by cognition. The once lone voice of Tomkins (1962, 1963) now has a chorus of support, at least as far as affects are concerned.

Affects are now research-respectable while drives have been deleted. Yet drives are as viable and vital as affects in the lean, mean motivational model put forward here. Tomkins' theory of differential affects is added to Freud's early model of drives—a model which accords well with current neuropsychological evidence and evolutionary research (Westen, 1997). That affects and drives should have had such different reception is odd given that on certain definitions it is hard to distinguish them; affects as defined by Tomkins (1962, 1963) have much in common with drives as defined by Freud up until his adoption of the notion of a death drive (1920/1955). Both have innate components, they are both malleable in terms of what elicits them and in their manner of expression, and both are shaped within an ongoing relational system. Both underpin bodily pleasure, which is part of intimacy and our relations to others. Further, both underpin our mentality in so far as they are 'intentional engines'—they are the 'subpersonal knowers'—apprehending features of the world that we bump into as well as features of our psychic reality. Just as for Panksepp (2000) basic affects or the basic emotion systems have 'minds of their own' (p. 237), drives, for Freud, are the 'knowers' in that they are somatically anchored sources of policy with regard to aspects of reality relevant to their satisfaction, and are readily affected by information relevant to their satisfaction or frustration. While current empirical evidence from affective neuroscience supports the existence of both basic affects and drives (Panksepp, 1998, 2000), elsewhere drives remain doubly disenfranchised: excluded from mainstream psychology, and from many contemporary strands of psychoanalysis, a domain where they once held sway. These form the two distinct targets to my critique.

While drives *and* affects figure strongly in Tomkins' theory, the affective revolution in psychology, which has been gaining momentum since the 1980s, has excluded drives. The role of affects like shame, anger and fear is well researched in the study of personality styles like narcissism and psychopathy, while features of sexuality relevant to these personality styles—like exhibitionism, taking serial lovers, psychopathic excitement at the suffering of another who is manipulated and harmed—are less considered. In the attachment literature, evolutionary mechanisms promoting attachment behaviours and representations are of primary concern; the pleasures of the body that does the attaching, the uncolonized, extra-linguistic body, is somewhere out of the theoretical picture. Yet an inner working model is a 'hot', affectively charged schema (McIlwain, 2006) where drives and affects connect with cognition. As Tomkins' pioneering work made clear (1962, 1963), beliefs and belief structures lack motivational clout and cannot do the work of affects and drives. Many contemporary accounts of an affect or emotion are cognitive schemas in 'affective drag', as Lewis and Granic (2000) suggest. When more constructivist approaches see cognitive schemas as the

vehicles for emotional development, 'emotion itself gets lost in this portrayal as it is merely treated as another component of an essentially cognitive process' (p. 4).

In psychoanalysis, the body's multiple, highly individual pleasures have been progressively excluded in the move(s) from a classical Freudian paradigm to object relations theory, self psychology and intersubjectivism. The dismissal of drives from psychoanalytic theory (but see Green, 1996) was in part based on moral arguments, unnecessary dichotomies of relatedness versus drives, or on the mistaken belief that in an explanatory model cognitive or self structures can take the theoretical place of the 'urgedness' of drives. The deterministic account of personality development offered here encompasses the fact that in the course of life history we arrive at unique, personal developmental outcomes, while sidestepping essentialism or teleology inherent in accounts of positing a drive to relate, find one's true self or self-actualize.

So, in two domains, drives and bodily pleasure are demoted from being motivating in themselves, to serving interpersonal relations and intimacy—in the mature individual that is. This sidelines a particular way of thinking about the body and its effects, displacing concern with pleasure within psychology, where we have bought ourselves into 'a mess of wellbeing' (Phillips, 1998), and within psychoanalysis, where mature intimacy is privileged.

While few personality theorists line up with mind/body dualists, it isn't enough to assume embodiment as a part of one's theory. The challenge is to spell out *how* the messy pleasures of the body shape personality. Drives and affects are intentional engines, that is, they reach for objects that might satisfy in psychic reality or objects outside our skin. Including biologically anchored affects and drives does not commit us to a 'biology is destiny' stance. From the start, they are deeply malleable within ongoing relational systems. Drives do not 'originate deep within an interior of a Cartesian isolated mind' (Stolorow, 2002, p. 678) any more than affects do. They bring about the enfolding of the subpersonal and the cultural. The residues of our desirous and affectively charged relationships are like little chunks of culture porously permeating a person's psyche. Intersubjective experience shapes from the very start the organization and vicissitudes of drives (Freud, 1908/1959, 1915/1946a; Loewald, 1978/2000) and the very formation of affects and emotions (Campbell, 1997; Tomkins, 1962, 1963). Both drives and affects are relevant to how we form a sense of self and apprehend the mentality of others.

Pleasure mediates our transaction with the physical and interpersonal world, sets up the (highly unstable and constantly renegotiable) distinction between 'what is me' and 'what is not me'. Pleasure traverses the very distinction between self and other/world which it made possible, as when we are 'absorbed' (Tellegen & Atkinson, 1974). Only when the distinction between self and world is stably known (if intermittently felt) can there be pleasure in giving up that distinction, blurring self/other, self/world, as in mystical experiences, charisma and love. There is no such pleasure in fragmentation and psychosis.

Pleasure is underpinned by (among other things) basic affects and drives. Much that is of interest to contemporary personality psychologists hinges on affect–affect links and affect–drive links—a process Tomkins calls ‘co-assembly’. ‘Co-assembly creates a unitary experience when an affect amplifies a signal from another psychological system’ (Moore & McDonald, 2000, p. 155). Co-assemblies in drive–affect, affect–affect, drive–drive connections and with cognition result in signature motivational complexes which characterize different personality styles. Shame–fear or shame–aggression links might characterize overt and covert narcissism (Izard, Ackerman, Schoff, & Fine, 2000). Affects and drives are part of a self-organizing system where early experiences result in unique co-assemblies producing a developmental shunting which renders more probable certain developmental paths and closes off others. A personality style arises from ‘cascading constraints’ (Lewis, 2000) where early developmental contingencies narrow what is possible or likely from later contingencies, leading to particular developmental paths. Our earliest exchanges with others powerfully concern the body, vital somatic needs and affective soothing. In self-organizing personality development, impulse, affect and emotion shape the structuring of thought, behaviour and patterns of relatedness. Their interlinking in the context of language and culture shapes the nuclear scenes, schemas and scripts (Carlson, 1981, 1982, 1986), autobiographical memories and life narratives we come to live by.

In the following section, I define drives and affects, showing their commonalities and the promise of drives for a theory of motivation. In the next section, I show why drives were (mistakenly) deleted. In the third section, the advantages are demonstrated of a *differential* affect theory over viewing affect as individuated by cognition. Tomkins’ inclusion of affects *and* drives is discussed as a prelude to demonstrating the utility of such a model in the final section across contemporary case studies of affective personality dispositions.

Wired to Survive: Defining Drives and Affects

While conjecture regarding the exact nature of the relationship between affects and drives (regarding which is primary, which ancillary) will draw many differences of opinion in the contemporary literatures of neuroscience, theory and clinical literatures, a fully embodied theory of motivation must embrace both.

Affects and drives each have innate features. Positing drives is consonant with an evolutionary psychology that suggests we are born wired to survive in an average expectable environment. Yet to flourish in the environment in which we actually find ourselves we need mechanisms with sufficient plasticity, in themselves or in their co-assembly, to change their manner of expression to take shape in ways related to where we find ourselves, and with whom. Are drives sufficiently pliable as motivational mechanisms?

'That we are motivated by our biological drives has been a basic paradigm since Plato,' says Tomkins. 'Protestors against the paradigm are perennial, but none of its competitors had its hardness' (Tomkins, 1962, p. 28). It survives, says Tomkins, because it has firm biological roots. The early Freud suggested there are two broad groups of drives promoting individual and species survival; the ego drives and the sex drives, respectively (see also Maze, 1983; Westen, 1997; Young-Bruehl, 2003). Freud (1915/1946a) saw drives as frontier concepts between the somatic and the mental, as a demand on the mind for work, defined somatically (as neural brain structures using sensory and motor mechanisms) but modifiable by cognition. 'They are set in motion by sensory and biochemical input, such as deprivation or noxious stimulation, and this initiates inbuilt action programs (consummatory actions), which, shaped by evolution, are likely to terminate their excitatory state' (Boag, 2003, p. 248).

The relation between drives, objects and aims means that they are not 'blind bodily forces' but psychobiological systems—psychical representatives of somatic forces (Petocz, 1999, p. 222). Yet what many neglect about Freud (1915/1946a) is that he saw drives as malleable. Both affects and drives are malleable in terms of what elicits them (there is no single object of affects or drives), and in their manner of expression. Drives inevitably meet with vicissitudes—necessary changes in their manner of expression (Freud, 1915/1946a)—and are readily shaped by affective consequences once behaviour is initiated. Before we have a full-blown morality it is the vicissitudes attendant on the experience of shame and disgust that can act as mental dams to diminish desires (Freud, 1908/1959; Tomkins, 1963). These experiences may be induced by others' responses to the expression of drives and are the prototypes of later defences. Affects and drives motivate not only what we do, but also what we attend to. Affective experiences such as shame and disgust in the face of our own need may differentially predispose us to attend away from aspects of our experience, and leave that experience unformulated (Lambie & Marcel, 2002). For instance, if we are shamed when we show needy dependence on others, or shamed when we experience excitement in the bodily presence of another, we may fail to attend to that experience, may not recognize the inner signs of a longing. Affects and drives also shape the mental associations we make (Green, 1997), the images we wishfully produce to pacify our impulses (Hopkins, 1999), and the aspects of relationships we retain (Loewald, 1978/2000) and take on board as part of our psychological make-up (Kernberg, 1995).

Viewing development as hinging in part on bodily drives and affects is not antithetical to plasticity of expression and development, and does not commit us to epigenetic unfolding of encapsulated modules (contra Mitchell, 2000) within an 'isolated Cartesian mind' (contra Stolorow, 2002). Drives, affects and intersubjective experience all contribute to a full explanatory model, where the reciprocity of influences shapes a person's unique, idiosyncratic psycho-affective history and landscape of desire that gives form to personality.

Tomkins accorded drives and affects well-demarcated, interacting roles in his theory. He provides two volumes of theory and evidence for innately specified programmes for an array of basic affects (Tomkins, 1962, 1963). Affects are only part of our emotional experience. The limbic localization of our phylogenetically ancient, pancultural elements of emotional response seems empirically secure. The affect programmes, Griffiths (1999) suggests, are independent of higher cognitive processes, and can be seen as a mechanism for saving us from our own intelligence by rapidly and involuntarily initiating essential behaviours. Griffiths suggests that there are at least two accounts required of emotions: one that captures the imperious, mandatory responses (here termed affects), and one that captures higher cognitive emotions (including self-conscious emotions; see Tracy & Robins, 2004).

Drives and affects have a signature pattern of capturing bodily arousal, breath and glands arising from their distinct bodily underpinnings and distinct patterns of neural firing. Tomkins (1962) defines affects as:

A set of muscles or glandular responses located in the face and also widely distributed through the body, which generate sensory feedback which is either inherently 'acceptable' or 'unacceptable'. These organized sets of responses are triggered at subcortical centres where specific programs for each distinct affect are stored. These programs are innately endowed and genetically inherited. When they are activated they can 'capture' widely distributed organs such as face, heart and the endocrines, imposing on them a correlated pattern of responses. (p. 243)

For him, affects were primary, in that without them nothing mattered, and with them anything could. He saw the thrill of sexuality as being as much about affect as specific sexual pleasure, since the inhibition of affect appears to diminish sexual pleasure itself in addition to robbing us of excitement. He thought many of our most interesting attributes arose from our affective struggle with drives (hunger, thirst and sex). Affects, he notes, are a separate system or motivation, not wholly dependent on cognition for their individuation, or mere representatives of the drives. For Tomkins, affects are separate from drives, separate from cognition and differ from each other from the start. In a refreshing de-emphasis of the centrality of cognition to psychological experience and development, Tomkins addresses affect–affect links (e.g. shame–contempt–humiliation) and the amplification of drives by affects.

Multiple Motivations: Minds of Their Own

Taking seriously multiple sources of motivation reveals what remarkable outcomes are behavioural coherence and attitudinal consistency. Having drives and affects, each with its own policies, presents the individual with almost too much opportunity for contingency and inner conflict. If drives function as knowers, all differently oriented both to the world and to experiences of one's own body, suddenly intriguing phenomena like procrastination, acting like

one's own worst enemy and self-deception are more readily explained (from such a perspective) than is possible within more rationalist, cognitive assumptions. With multiple sources of motivation, we are not only able to deceive others, but can become strangers to what we 'really want' and feel, because we can want multiple, conflicting, mutually exclusive things—now! We find ourselves like 'sunflowers whose suns are various and hidden, we see ourselves going in all sorts of directions, often at once' (Phillips, 1998, p. 15).

The Promise of Drives

Though there is much variation in how they are defined, affects, emotions and feelings are now well-represented objects of study within mainstream psychology and psychoanalysis. It has scarcely been remarked upon that this emphasis has occurred at the expense of the drives. What do drives offer when included as motivating elements alongside differential affects?

Their re-inclusion moves us towards a more fully embodied theory of mind. Freud's determinism (Maze, 1983; Petocz, 1999) meant for him that every mental event had a physical basis. In his early work he defined drives by their bodily source, viewed them, as we have seen, as a frontier concept between the psychic and the somatic, a continuously flowing endogenous source of stimulation, accepting in his early theory those that admitted of no further dissection, though he thought it was an open question as to how many drives there might be.

Freud from 1910 to 1920 saw drives as ensuring the survival of the individual organism being pitted against those enhancing the survival of the species. Sex ensures the survival of the species with a pleasurable surplus accruing to the individual (and many individuals settle for the pleasurable surplus). Freud did not suggest that drives were not open to modification by learning: the diverse component instincts of sexuality can undergo many complex vicissitudes taking them well off the path of promoting pleasure via rhythmic stimulation of the mucous membranes (for the individual) and reproduction (for the species). While sex is (at least in part) biological, the erotic is most definitely cultural (Lambie & Marcel, 2002). The so-called 'ego-instincts' of Freud's early period (which he never fully specified) that ensure the survival of the individual are, according to Maze (1983; see also Young-Bruehl, 2003), hunger, thirst, pain-avoidance (which Tomkins calls a reflex rather than a true drive; 1962, p. 58) and temperature regulation. These, too, can undergo vicissitudes. Freud suggests that there can be an anaclitic 'propping on' of one drive on another, and a confluence of instincts gaining satisfaction from a single activity (Adler, cited in Freud, 1915/1946a, p. 119). There is sensuality to eating, as well as a satisfaction of hunger. This is one basis of the psychoanalytic notion of an action being 'overdetermined'. Maze (1983) suggests that 'Freud's metapsychology, though unfinished, was the one great systematic attempt in modern psychology to outline a deterministic,

physiologically based theory of motivation and extend it to embrace all of human behaviour, bodily and mental' (p. 142–143). Freud's beleaguered 'nirvana principle' (which assumes we seek to remove all tensions)—ably critiqued by Kitcher (1992)—is not untenable if one accepts, as Freud did, that there can be 'pleasurable tensions' (Whitebook, 1995). Such pleasurable tensions are present both in drives—demonstrated by foreplay and 'saving one's hunger'—and in affects which underpin much of 'intrinsic motivation', such as curiosity and interest (Loewenstein, 1994; Silvia, 2001).

Westen's blueprint for motivation. In a landmark paper advancing a theory of motivation, Westen (1997) hails Lichtenberg's (1989) model as an advance on Freud's final dual-motivation Eros/Thanatos stance. Any advance is welcome over Freud's *final* motivational model, which entailed the teleologically defined death drive and a life impulse so vague and broadly specified as to have little explanatory value. Lichtenberg has five motivational systems, including 'physiological regulation, attachment, exploration/assertion, withdrawal or antagonism in response to aversive events and sensual/sexual pleasure' (Westen, 1997, p. 523).

Yet Lichtenberg's model is not so much of an advance when compared with Freud's early motivational metapsychological position (described above). Lichtenberg does not distinguish sex from hunger and does not 'cash out', that is, does not examine the causal or material underpinning of, the tendency to explore or assert, which would be so easy to do in affective terms via Tomkins' basic affects such as curiosity and interest. At the level of drives it is useful to separate sex, hunger, pain-avoidance, temperature regulation and breathing, as the early Freud does, and as is supported by contemporary evidence (Westen, 1997). Including Tomkins' primary affects and drive-auxiliaries such as disgust, fear and (the affect auxiliary) shame gives richer accounts of avoidance, as might the inclusion of anger enhance accounts of assertion. Separately characterizing drives and affects gives a nuanced theory, grounded in the body and consonant with contemporary empirical evidence. Such separate characterization avoids Westen's (1997) criticism of those who postulate 'master motives' rather than 'specific motivational systems more consonant with natural selection' (p. 526), and defining drives by their source, not their objects or goals, is consonant with evolutionary psychology's interest in mechanisms.

Westen's (1997) comment that to 'the extent that hunger motivation falls anywhere in Freud's drive theory, it must be part of the sex drive' (p. 526) is a problem only for Freud's later metapsychological grouping of drives, not for the early Freud, who is part of the lean, mean model offered here. That different hypothalamic regions regulate eating and sexual behaviours (Westen, 1997) is also not a problem for the model advanced here. Rather it is welcome support for the separateness (and the existence) of these drives. As Westen (1997) himself notes, 'Freud's first approximation of a theory of motivation proposed the dual instincts of self-preservation and sex, which is

not very far afield from the way contemporary evolutionary theorists define reproductive success in terms of survival and reproduction' (p. 526).

Since Westen (1997) provides a blueprint for judging a model of motivation in terms of scope, clinical relevance, empirical constraints and consonance with contemporary research, let's look at some of his conclusions. He says that if affect is viewed as central to motivation there are two costs: the revision of Freud's theory of motivation meets with the obstacle that the 'sexual is recognized as *one* form of pleasure' (p. 524); and, second, Freud's structural model looks shaky all of a sudden. Sex *is* only one form of pleasure for the early Freud, who saw hunger as a separate drive. The pleasure of hunger is marvellously played out by Tomkins (1962), who suggests there is for eating the analogue of a set of minor orgasms, that appetite and satiety are separate mechanisms. After talking about the hypothalamic mechanisms which control each, he notes that if there is highly intense pleasure from food, this can supply its own motivation. So much for the hypothalamic mechanisms. Food can provide its own motivation, as any bon vivant knows.

If affect is viewed as central to motivation, says Westen, the concept of the id defined by its function (the psychic seat of motivation) is no longer tenable. Motivation, he goes on to say, becomes a property of affect which can be conscious or unconscious, primitive or mature, adaptive or maladaptive, and is as much a property of the ego as the id. Might that not also be true of the drives in sublimated forms of expression? The model of motivation presented here has no great investment in Freud's structural model. I'm not sure why (or even *if* Westen is truly suggesting that) motivation has to become solely 'a property of affect', since no argument has been raised yet as to why affects' centrality to motivation (or 'primacy', to use Tomkins' word) entails the exclusion of the motivating role of drives. Westen (1997, p. 529) does not ignore the ways drive states influence behaviour (he uses hunger and sex in his later examples), but he suggests that they do so via feelings as the instigators of behaviour. Westen's theory of drives is a little like Freud's theory of affects. Westen says that drives exist but we only know them by feelings. Freud says affects exist, but only as emanations of drives (at least until 1926). Westen (1997) puts affects at centre stage, suggesting that they 'are the mechanisms for the selective retention of behavioural and mental responses [since] regulation of affect becomes a way of adaptively regulating behaviour' (p. 529). Affect regulation includes conscious or unconscious procedures that people use to maximize and minimize unpleasant emotions. Westen's account is compelling; as selection pressures naturally select organisms, emotional responses 'naturally select' behavioural and mental processes that are pleasurable and select against those that are aversive. My point is that at least some of those pleasurable behavioural and mental responses might be directly motivated by drives.

By retaining the view of drives from the early Freud, plus basic affects (from Tomkins), the model meets some of the requirements of a model of

motivation suggested by Westen (1997). Why, then, did drives get the boot? They most certainly did historically within psychoanalysis, for all the wrong reasons, as I hope to show.

Drives and Relationships

To pit relatedness issues against bodily need is misleading and unhelpfully broad; as Westen (1997) says, 'choosing between a theory of libidinal versus relational drives is like taking sides on whether people are, at root, *really* motivated by hunger or by thirst' (p. 528). And yet it happened. An either/or debate, portrayed as a shift in emphasis from drives to relationship, began with the work of Fairbairn (1952) and resulted in a deracination of drive theory. Without space to do justice to the complexity of differing psychoanalytic accounts, I'll merely address selectively the nature of the arguments offered to de-emphasize drives.

Guntrip (1971/1977) mounts a transcendental argument. He baulks at according motivational status to sub-personal processes like drives. For him Freud's deterministic view of the drives meant psychoanalysis began with 'a defective realization of the importance of the concept "Person" ' (p. 105). Thus, Guntrip says, 'Freud could take the term "id" from Groddeck, who wrote, "We should not say 'I live' but 'I am lived by the It'." This completely destroys the unique and responsible individuality of the person' (p. 105). Guntrip's transcendental argument is as follows: Freud's drive theory suggests that man is lived by 'it'. This is unworthy of (and incompatible with) humans' unique and responsible individuality. Humans have unique and responsible individuality, therefore drive theory cannot pertain.

From my theoretical model this could fruitfully be posed in reverse: given our make-up (part of which includes subpersonal intentional engines like affects and drives), how is it that some humans achieve, to some extent, unique and responsible individuality? Guntrip's *modus tollens* is my *modus ponens*.

Guntrip's (1971/1977) argument is a moral one, rather than one based on observation, science or psychological process. Committed to a vision of the individual as having a true self, which is whole and responsible and the origin of his or her actions, he replaces Freud's psychosexual stages with a scheme based on the quality of relationships with objects, moving from immature dependency to mature dependency. Guntrip sees object relations theory as 'the emancipation of Freud's psychodynamical thinking from its bondage to his "natural science" ' (p. 20). Guntrip suggests that the human being is carrier not of germ plasm, as Freud (1915/1946a) famously said, but of a 'latent self'. A human being 'has bodily appetites and functions to subserve existence, great mental resources, and a latent self that is his *raison d'être* to find and be in the process of relating to his complex material and

human environment' (Guntrip, 1971/1977, p. 111). He banishes the id (aka the instinctual drives):

The only escape from a dualism of radically opposed structures is to banish the term 'id' and reserve 'ego' to denote the whole basically unitary psyche with its innate potential for developing into a true self, a whole person, using his psychosomatic energies for self-expression and self-realization in interpersonal relationships. (p. 41)

This is a costly exchange. A bodily anchored, deterministic developmental account is exchanged for an essentialist account of a 'true self' which it is our 'innate potential' to develop. The deterministic account has more explanatory muscle in that development is anchored in the body, and development advances as a result of social transactions centring on pleasure—bodily pleasure and the pleasure of other minds. Freud suggested that bodily pleasures are frequently of a shared nature, and development occurs as caretakers shift emphasis regarding which pleasures are at issue. The meeting of vital somatic needs is in the matrix of, accompanied by and overlain by, intersubjective exchanges. Granted a fuller account is needed of our differential capacity for self-expression, self-reflectivity and self-realization in relation to others—worthy *explananda* of a personality and cultural theory—and some features of that are addressed well by research on attunement, intersubjectivity and attachment. The model I'm putting forward merely asserts that pleasure, bodily pleasure, is part of the story.

Pleasure and Intimacy: A Contingent Coupling

In classical Freudian psychoanalysis bodily pleasures involving mucous membranes and rhythmic stimulation once held sway as the nexus of the psychohistory of an individual's landscape of desire. It was culture meets biology at the orifice. The pleasures of the body mapped the history-taking deemed vital to understanding anything about character: the mistakes a person might make, dreams and symptoms she or he might have, and ruinous love paths she or he might follow. As I've suggested, dispensing with bodily pleasures has sidelined a way of thinking about the body, of acknowledging its effects. We are assured that many things can take its place: for instance, our relations to others.

Fairbairn (1952) suggests in discussing the sex drive that 'libido is primarily object-seeking (rather than pleasure-seeking as in classical theory)' (p. 82). This is philosophical challenge enough to the position of pleasure and pain in the original psychoanalytic scheme of human motivations, as Szasz's (1957/1975, p. 192) detailed analysis of Freud and Fairbairn shows. Pleasure is suspect for Fairbairn (1952), who says that 'from the point of view of object-relations psychology, explicit pleasure-seeking represents a deterioration of behaviour' (p. 139), adding that 'since libidinal need is object-need, simple

tension-relieving implies some failure of object-relationships' (p. 140). Rather than the *contingent coupling* of bodily pleasure and pleasure in relationships that Freud suggests (the drives necessarily implicating us intimately in social exchanges of the most formative kind), libido is hard-wired to relationship for Fairbairn. For Fairbairn, 'explicit pleasure-seeking' or 'tension reduction' arises from its *uncoupling* from relationships. Pleasure is read as a sign of some deterioration or perversity, some failure of object-relations. For Freud, the drive is to some extent object-seeking, in so far as quite explicit information is built into the component processes of the sex drive as to what would satisfy. Initially even part-objects satisfy. Developmental organization of component features of the sex drive shape adult sexuality, and organ pleasure is linked with intimacy and with reproduction (normatively). The sex drives have the most plasticity of expression for Freud, making possible pleasure and complex perceptions of self and other which experience can link or not. That sexual pleasure and affection can be separate is well explored by Freud. That many have difficulty in uniting them is explored in his discussion of the Madonna-whore complex, 'where they love they do not desire and where they desire they cannot love' (Freud, 1912/1957a, p. 183).

Freud is not merely a philosopher of the one-night stand. He does emphasize organ pleasure, the quality of stimulation (rhythmic, to minimize habituation). 'It is probable, however, that what is felt as pleasure is not the absolute degree of the tensions but something in the rhythm of their changes' (Freud, 1920/1955, pp. 15–16). He has a marvellously grim view of the equivalence of socialized sublimated delights to their less modulated versions. 'The feeling of happiness produced by wild, untamed craving is incomparably more intense than is the satisfying of curbed desire. The irresistibility of perverted impulses, perhaps the charm of forbidden things generally, may in this way be explained economically' (Freud, 1929/1946c, pp. 32–33). Fleeting contrasts of states enhance our pleasure: 'When any condition desired by the pleasure principle is protracted, it results in a feeling only of mild comfort; we are so constituted that we can only intensely enjoy contrasts, much less intensely states in themselves' (Freud, 1929/1946c, pp. 27–28). His more modulated understanding of pleasure acknowledges the irreplaceable nature of those loved, with our very psyche and longing shaped in large measure by identification and the residues of lost relationships (see 'Mourning and Melancholia' [Freud, 1915/1957b]). He includes accounts of pleasure quite removed from direct stimulation of the body, related to symbolization, signification and play inspired by absence of the one sought. He wanted to ground pleasure first in the body, but this was not because he thought that was the full story.

In You Out There: The Mistaken Boundaries of the Pleasure Ego

There is a *contingent coupling* of bodily pleasure and pleasure in relationships for Freud—once you work out where you end and the other/world begins.

Early experience of others links the specificity of a particular body to its intersubjectively shaped pleasures. The early pleasure that others afford an infant is at the heart of the initial development of drives. As Ellie Ragland (1995) suggests, '*primary identifications* furnish the material that links the body to the world—that shows how matter becomes mind—via necessarily narcissistic effects' (p. 28). This account accords with Freud's account of primary narcissism, where pleasure initially leads us to draw a mistaken boundary between self, world and other. As pleasure ego we include as part of ourselves all that is pleasurable, though it may include the softness of our mother's skin, the warmth of the sun, as well as the satisfying fullness of our belly. We arrogate to the external world all that is unpleasurable, though it may include the itchiness of our skin. This position is often acknowledged as Loewald's (1978/2000), and he draws out the significance of this phase with his characteristic acuteness. In Freud's account of primary narcissism (as with Kohut's 'selfobject'; 1971, 1977) the pleasure afforded by another person is initially experienced as part of oneself. This is what leads Freud to suggest that the distinction between inner and outer is a developmental achievement (Freud, 1915/1946a, p. 115). Developmentally, this enables us to move from assimilating world and other, from relating to an 'object' drawn along the lines of pleasure, to discovering objects *de re* that can move discretely in time and space. Assimilative pleasure makes way for experiencing the other as other.

Pleasure and Person

Freud's account of the drives acknowledges the specificity of requirements for rhythm and change (dimensions on which there are vast individual differences). Yet there is specificity in the formative role of object relationships in receiving and responding to that pleasure (as Stern's [1985] work will be used to show) where, psychically, pleasure and person may link up. Pleasure and person may remain uncoupled given bad-enough early experience, and pleasure-seeking or tension reduction may represent that fact, rather than represent a deterioration of something organically programmed as intrinsic to the nature of the drive. Seeking pleasure not persons may be part of the cascading constraints of development promoting a particular developmental path, a form of developmental shunting.

Winnicott and Khan (1953) criticized the either/or divide being set up by Fairbairn between pleasure and intimacy. Indeed, it is not supported by the evidence, which suggests that children are well organized around relating to others from an extremely early age (Trevarthen, 1979), that they fail to thrive without tenderness, and that they get pleasure from their bodies. It is hard to see the explanatory advantage of precluding from the start the possibility of pleasure not in the service of relationships. Mitchell's account of Fairbairn's notion of libido as object-seeking suggests that 'rather than being the vehicle for the satisfaction of a specific need ... it is the expression of our very nature,

the form through which we become specifically *human* beings' (Mitchell, 2000, p. 106). To say that it is part of our nature is not to say very much. Again the dichotomy invoked leads to a less complete explanatory model.

The relationships-not-drives theme persists from Fairbairn to the present. In Greenberg and Mitchell's (1983) account, they portray the object relations perspective as 'a conceptual framework in which relations with others constitute the fundamental building block of mental life. The creation, or recreation, of specific modes of relatedness with others replaces drive discharge as the force motivating human behaviour' (p. 3). The drives lose out:

... this revision of the pleasure principle opens the hermeneutics of the drive/structural model to a greater emphasis on the conditions in which pleasure was experienced during the course of an individual's development. The specificity which the drive has lost, the interpersonal context has gained, or, more accurately, regained. (p. 58)

In this either/or account, the drives lose specificity that the interpersonal context gains. Yet theoretically both could have specificity, the contingent interlinking of which is part of the story of individual development, bonding and sharing experience.

The divide addressed here is not between a classical, *intrapsychic* account and a *social* object relations theory, since object relations are not interpersonal relationships, but internal psychic structures that are complexly the residues of such interactions. While Freud is often criticized as having neglected the social, Frosh (1987) suggests that object relations theory is not truly social since it never really gets beyond the dyad. Rather than veering between caricatures of Freud (reputedly giving us nothing more than an internalist picture of solipsistic, onanistic, part-object and forget-the-rest bestial pleasure) and an intimacy-oriented, social account of mature pleasure that hard-wires pleasure to objects, there is another path. Drives are formative in delineating inner from outer in the way that they impel us towards others and towards the world, and are in turn formed by the nature of the reception they get. They are modified by affective experiences, by our intersubjective experiences, experiences of the most formative kind precisely because we need.

Without drives it is hard to give an account of repression, where 'one part of the psychological apparatus knows something that another part does not know' (Maze, 1983, p. 162). Repression is the cornerstone of psychoanalysis and required for material to be unconscious in a dynamic sense. The psychical conflict central to repression necessitates consideration of a multiplicity of motivations deterministically specified at the level of the body: 'In order to accommodate the facts of mental conflict, of a conflict of interests within a single mind, there must be a plurality of drives, at least two' (Petocz, 1999, p. 221). It is surprising, then, that so much current psychoanalytic theory is discussed without any explicit recognition that drives or (at times) even affects may play a part in the metapsychology. Drive conflict is central to

repression; affects are implicated in attending away from certain aspects of experience, resulting in them remaining unformulated—the basis of contemporary formulations of unconscious processes (Lambie & Marcel, 2002).

The Era of Self: Structures, Telos and Sex

Since the libertine 1960s, sexual conflicts are not seen as so much of an issue for those presenting for therapy. Kohut (1971, 1977) de-emphasized drives in favour of the importance of experiences conducive to an integrated and appropriately valued self-structure. Cohesion, integrity, esteem issues and a sense of emptiness were more pervasive than sexual conflicts in a cohort of American clients, a phenomenon that Lasch (1979) also addressed. Kohut suggests that deficits in the self-structure arise from difficulties experienced with carers in the early environment of the child. Initially carers are not experienced as separate but as 'selfobjects'. For Kohut (1971), they are not realistically viewed but idealized, and merger with an 'idealized omnipotent other' (p. 400) is critical to the development of 'self'. For Kohut, 'the adult's empathic response sets up a situation in which the child's phase-appropriate need for merger with an omnipotent object is sufficiently fulfilled to prevent traumatization' (p. 399). If this merger didn't occur at a right time for the child, 'low level narcissistic wounds' result, as an individual lacks certain psychic structures that would have developed when merger broke down. At the end of merger, the 'idealizing cathexes' are withdrawn from the object and set up within the subject's psychic apparatus (Cushman, 1986), very like the notion of identification that Freud (1917/1946b) describes, where the 'shadow of the object falls upon the ego' (p. 258). Kohut (1978) suggests that if the breakdown of the merger is not completed, 'the subject will lack idealized psychic structures (one way of maintaining self-esteem) and will be left yearning to find a substitute for a missing (or insufficiently developed) psychic structure' (p. 400). He notes that 'such persons are forever seeking with an addiction-like intensity, and often through sexual means (the clinical picture may be that of perversion), to establish a relationship to people who serve as stand-ins for the omnipotent idealized self-object' (p. 400). This last quotation implies that what impels a person to find the right selfobject to make good the lack may in fact be the component sex-drives, since, Kohut notes, the clinical picture may be that of perversion. With an inadequately integrated sense of self, it may be that the component sex-drives may not be integrated and organized in genital sexuality, and may retain a more perverse organization. Kohut's account of the way that self-object relations contribute to a sense of self (and potentially to self-reflective function) is a very real contribution, but as ontology it is incomplete.

The structure of self, while it may have importance in its own right, cannot take the theoretical place of drives. As Lothane (1983) notes, Kohut:

... invented a hypostasis, an entity, which he called the structure self ... this fictional structure embodies an anatomical simile. The dynamic conflict

model ... has been given up in favour of a quasi-neurological defect model. The deficit or defect in the structure can be corrected by the addition of a missing ingredient, love, which is renamed empathy. (p. 210)

Explanation entails creating heuristic models to test against empirical (which includes clinical) evidence. However, the teleology in Kohut's position is not consonant with a deterministic explanatory account. According to Lothane:

... through the experience of empathic nurturing, obtained from a selfobject, the self, stunted by defects due to a lack of such nurturing in early childhood, achieves a state of restoration. The self has a need for a selfobject to complete its development. (p. 212)

Without drives or affects, such a position falls heir to all of the difficulties of teleological attempts to explain behaviour and experience. Lack, in this sense, is not like a cause. Maze (1983) suggests that this point becomes clear if we consider the case where all that a car may need to start is a spark plug, but he adds that this in no way causes the arrival or development of what is needed. Further, with teleological accounts of development, it is always possible to specify subgoals or further goals; yet it is impossible to state *a priori* what complete development might consist in (Maze, 1983). How does the impetus for that development arise from a structure with deficits? Right now in the literature it seems possible that the concept of self, used in this way, masks an explanatory gap. Some developmental, causal account must be given of the differential experience of psychological integration and the powerful need to maintain self-esteem—this is part of the explanatory brief of a clinically sound theory of motivation, as Westen (1997) argues. Kohut's (1971) account of merger and identification is vital to how one's sense of self is modified by intersubjective experience, but, as a stand-alone account of personality development, it is lacking. A 'self'-structure cannot take the place of drives and affects. It is significant in this light that later innovators in this domain, like Goldberg (1996), Lichtenberg (1989) and Stolorow and colleagues, have included affect within their metapsychologies (see Stolorow, Atwood, & Brandchaft, 1994), though, notably, not drives (Stolorow, 2002).

Drives and the Slippery Slope

Giving theoretical place to bodily drives is not a slippery slope to reactionary reductionism that forgets the 'aboutness' that many philosophers see as the mark of the mental, reduces psychology to neuropsychological underpinnings, and neglects social and cultural domains. A bodily anchored theory is consonant with human experience. Could we really be such new people with new needs that sex and hunger are off the agenda?

Retaining drives and affects means we have an honest metapsychology (we cannot live by meaning, transference and intersubjectivity alone), retaining what is explanatorily useful from earlier theories. Discovery and shifts in emphasis

need not dispense with useful concepts without adequate basis for so doing. Fashion, cliques, cults and the heat of ideology appear to generate theories about 'what should be' or 'what we want to be true of us' rather than what evidence suggests is the case. Examining each issue in terms of the theoretical implications and consonance with research is better if we aim to explain phenomena rather than attempt to sustain the sociological innovativeness of new movements.

Relatedness Needs: A Drive to Relate or Hot, Affective Schemas?

So how does giving due place to drives and affects address the challenge of accounting for relatedness? Greenberg (1991) and Maze (1993) suggest that in attempting to sidestep drives, positions like Fairbairn's end up tacitly positing a unitary 'drive to relate'. As Westen (1997) notes, not all affects are interpersonal or linked to object relations or derivative of relationships. The power of relatedness needs operates via attachment experiences recruiting affects and drives for social and cultural ends, promoting the formation of internal working models that are more or less 'hot', affectively based schemas. To posit separate mechanisms for every kind of attachment experience and relatedness phenomenon puts us in tautological territory.

Westen (1997) distinguishes groupings of relatedness, noting that:

... the motivational systems mediating children's attachment behaviour are probably quite different from those that regulate desires for friendship ... that separation distress is quite distinct physiologically and phenomenologically from the feelings friends may have who miss each other, and it probably involves different neurotransmitter systems. (p. 526)

While recent research suggests that internal working models are often specific to particular relationships, and are not conclusively predictive of later relationships (Laible & Thompson, 2000), there is also evidence to suggest that early attachment style is predictive of later relationship style. Early attachment experiences entail dependency on others in a life-and-death way and affect-regulation is almost wholly an interpersonal exchange at the start. We should not be surprised if emotions attendant on separation from friends differ. That there might be different neurotransmitters implicated in early separation experiences and missing friends is not incontrovertible evidence for their radical difference. They are still emotional experiences in the face of unwanted loss.

So, what kind of account are we to give of affects? What advantages does a differential affect theory (which assumes certain basic affects existing as separate from the start) have over more appraisal-based theories of emotion? Why use Tomkins? Is Freud's theory of affect a candidate for inclusion in the synthetic model proposed here? Freud was strong in his account of drives, weaker in his conception of affect, precisely because he largely characterized them in his metapsychological writings as ancillary to drives.

Unconscious Emotions and the Trouble with Propositional Attitude Theories of Emotion

Freud's theory of affect remained sketchy (Deigh, 2001; Green, 1997; Rappaport, 1953; Westen, 1985, 1997), as he himself seemed to recognize from the start (1900/1953, see especially section VI, subsection H, pp. 595–627). In many places in his writing, affects are largely seen as manifestations of drives. 'If the instinct did not attach itself to an idea or manifest itself as an affective state, we could know nothing about it' (Freud, 1900/1953, p. 179). For Freud, there is an uneasy slippage between clinical data and theory; clinically, he knows there to be unconscious emotions, yet he finds it hard to give a theoretical account of them. It is particularly the difficulty with unconscious, emotions that reveals his theory of emotion to be lacking. He couldn't account for how they can remain as individuated emotions while unconscious partly because of the role that he accords to cognition in individuating an otherwise undifferentiated 'charge of affect'. Freud recognized that if affect and idea come apart in repression, and that affect and (idea) representation have different trajectories in the process of defence, then, after repression, there could be no qualitative differences among affects, and therefore it seemed as though unconscious emotions could not exist, 'strictly speaking'. Green (1997) even suggests that using such a term constituted an 'abuse of language' for Freud. 'In general, the use of the terms "unconscious affect" and "unconscious emotion" has reference to the vicissitudes undergone, in consequence of repression, by the quantitative factor in the instinctual impulse' (Freud, 1900/1953, p. 180). By 'quantitative factor' he means the generic anxiety or 'charge of affect'. On this reading Freud seems to fall into the difficulties that await any propositional attitude theorists of emotion (for a discussion, see Griffiths, 1999). For such theories, cognition is required theoretically to play so constitutive a role in the differentiation of affects that their affectivity and the causal role of that affectivity get lost.

Freud (1900/1953) notes that repressing affects is very different from repressing ideas since affects correspond to processes of discharge, the final manifestations of which are perceived as feelings. The difference is that 'unconscious ideas continue to exist after repression as actual structures in the system *Ucs.*, whereas all that corresponds in that system to unconscious affects is a potential beginning which is prevented from developing' (p. 180). Instead of embracing the notion that therefore there can be no unconscious emotions, Freud notes thus: 'there are no unconscious affects *in the same way* that there are unconscious ideas' (p. 180). Deigh's (2001) nuanced reading suggests that 'Freud is not saying that the term "unconscious emotion" applies to no states of mind. Otherwise he would have to admit that fault could be found with his using it' (p. 1250). Deigh adds that neither does Freud mean that the term 'unconscious emotion' refers only to neurological events rather than mental ones. 'Neurological properties of a state cannot explain its

transmission of meaning to its products. So unconscious emotions had to be conceived of as mental, though differently so from unconscious ideas' (Deigh, 2001, p. 1250). From what Freud knows clinically to be the case, affects have to be able to remain differentiated even when unconscious, so they cannot be reliant on cognition for their differentiation, since the connection between idea and affect is lost through repression. (Petocz, 1999 suggests that this account of repression may require some reworking.) Freud sees affects as differentiated even when unconscious, but perhaps only in so far as affects are (for him) the manifestations of different instinctual impulses. He does not have a full differential affect theory such as that offered by Tomkins (1962, 1963) and by Izard (1977).

Differential Affect Theory: There is More to Affects than Pleasure and Pain

One question Westen (1997) poses is 'whether the regulation of affect states (seeking pleasure and avoiding pain) is an underlying mechanism involved in all motivation ... or whether it constitutes a separate and parallel motive system' (p. 523). Tomkins (1962) says there is more to affects than seeking pleasure and avoiding pain, but that is integral to all motivation. He speaks of 'the four most general goals or images of human beings with respect to affects' (p. 67), noting that 'we do not mean that they are inherited, but rather that there is so high a probability that they will be generated that we may for the most part regard them as inevitable in the development of all human beings' (p. 67). He lists them: '1) Positive affect should be maximized, 2) Negative affect should be minimized, 3) Affect inhibition should be minimized, 4) Power to maximize positive affect, minimize negative affect and minimize affect inhibition should be maximized' (p. 67).

Differential affect theory commits itself to a small, predetermined set of hard-wired affects (which have dedicated neural substrates that are possibly widely distributed and widely ramifying in the brain) that are all named across most cultures. We are not talking about emotions like guilt and revenge, which are likely to require a more social account of their development, a distinction ably discussed by Griffiths (1999) and Tracy and Robins (2004). The varieties of emotions experienced reflect differences in emotion-thought linkages, varying patterns of co-occurrence across discrete emotions, and varying emotion-emotion links (Izard et al., 2000).

Contemporary evidence for differential affects is provided by Panksepp (2000), who suggests 'the subcortically situated core systems for emotionality are organized homologously in the brain of all mammals, and may generate remarkably similar internal feelings (and affective states) in all of us' (p. 237). They promote both an action-readiness and mood-congruent dynamics of cognitive activities. Basic emotions as 'evolutionary memories project potentially adaptive behaviors into the future' (p. 237), and 'emotional systems

may be the primary governors of various self-organizing functions of the brain, such as the self, consciousness and intentionality' (p. 237). Together they can produce complex learning, planning and the generation of behaviour, and emotional systems may guide attentional processes.

Tomkins' View of the Relation between Drives and Affects

Tomkins accords a place for both drives and affects within his theoretical system, though it is amusing to note that he says:

... the first public presentation of this model was at a colloquium at Yale University in the early 1950s under the title, 'Drive Theory is Dead,' delivered with fear and trembling in the stronghold of Freudian and Hullian drive theory. To my surprise, it was well-received. (Tomkins, 1981/1995, p. 33)

For Tomkins, the activity of the drives requires the amplification of affect; without affects, the drives would never motivate us. Using the example of excitement, he shows the generality of the effects of amplification: 'But if excitement lends its magic to the drive system it is no less compelling as a support of sensory input, of memory, of thought and of action' (Tomkins, 1962, p. 76). The seeming urgency of the drive state is a consequence of an affective response. Drive pleasure and affective enjoyment are different, even when highly correlated, and he notes that 'drive pleasure may, under certain conditions, arouse distress or fear, as in psychotic depression or anorexia nervosa' (p. 71).

The affect system is capable of masking or inhibiting the drive signal or of being activated independently of it. Tomkins suggests that there are circumstances which select for this capacity to mask or inhibit drives by affects particularly in a socially responsive way, where we would be defenceless on our own were we to pursue our drives and capable of survival collectively (part of the story of our 'need to belong').

The affects are primary for Tomkins. If we respond to hunger or sex with fear or shame, then the strength of the drive is likely to be diminished. Yet the distinction Tomkins makes between drives and affects is not between higher and lower, but between more specific and more general, respectively. Drives, he suggests, guarantee our viability. They provide motivating information about where, when and what needs to be done to help oneself. Drives, then, contain both information and motivation in one signal system. The sensory systems provide only information, while the affect system is primarily motivational in nature (Tomkins, 1962, p. 30). Tomkins' account of drives reveals his debt to Freud. Drives activate our learning capacity in that when the drive response is activated it tells a very specific story about where the problem is. There is very specific information built into the site of consummation, and the intensity of the increase or decrease of pleasure means that we stop eating long before the tissue deficit has been overcome. The advantage of drives over

homeostatic mechanisms is that we can have awareness of drive signals and inhibit or postpone the consummatory response in a noxious environment. They are open to modification by learning, and they can come under our conscious control to some extent. This linkage of meaning and cause in drives and affects is something Tomkins shares with Freud, for whom there was no possibility of splitting the hermeneutic from the causal. For Freud, the symptoms that were the focus of his exploration were born of both.

Affects and anticipation. And it is the *nature* of the information that is at stake in Tomkins' comparative outline of the affect system. He is not merely concerned with amplification of drives by affects in the sense of the provision of strong stimuli. If that were all that were at stake, he suggests, it would be immaterial whether we stressed drives or affects as primary motivators. Crucially, *more general* information is provided by the affect system than by the drive system. This affective information allows the learning of avoidance behaviour (see also Westen, 1985).

There is added information in the affective response that accompanies a drive. Drives will only act as a motivator while operating, but we learn how to avoid something affectively, via anticipation. The role of affects is in the acquisition or extinction of anticipatory instinctual responses. Further, the anticipation of pain or other features of drive states is a special case of a general phenomenon of anticipation which requires a motivational system of much greater transformability than the drive system (Tomkins, 1962, p. 45). An affect 'may motivate other affects, and amplify and intensify the drive which it accompanies' (p. 45). Our breathing patterns are continually modulated by affects such as fear, joy, startle and distress. It is interesting to note that mindfulness therapies use the breath as a focus, and have as their aim an ability to tolerate the information in affect without judgement. It is as though focusing on the breath might be a first step in modulating affect which permits more flexibility in the feelings we have about our feelings, or about the meta-emotions that come into play as a result of our affective experiences (more on meta-emotions below).

Social modulation of affects. Tomkins' willingness to talk of the software and wet-ware of affects' physiology, as well as their role in shaping schemas and scripts, provides a useful framework that traverses a number of dichotomies: hard-wired elements and plasticity of development; bodily drives and affects and social relationships; affective/urgeful processes and cognition. His biologically based account of primary affects places corresponding emphasis on the centrality of social interaction in amplifying affective experience, and perhaps even in kick-starting the drives. Tomkins' view has us wired to survive via the kind of contacts with others that we are early skilled at making, but leaves in the picture that little surplus, pleasure. It's there in his inclusion of bodily drives and in the amplification of affects like excitement and joy,

and in our reception of their feeding back from others, in the dynamic shifts in affects he describes. Shaping occurs where affective experience is transformed by the quality of affective transaction and reception, where it becomes impossible to sift out in a single experience where heredity stops and nurture begins. The affect system, then, is one important way in which the specificity of the interpersonal context impacts on, shapes and is shaped by the specificity of bodily pleasures.

Interaction with others stimulates the affect system, which is so crucial to our development. The rhythm, texture and attunement of care might match (or not) the particular rhythm of pleasure required by a child's unique embodiment, with developmental consequences for the child's capacity to bond and self-soothe. Much more than learning to regulate affect occurs in such intersubjective exchanges, as shown in a close look at an example of attunement given by Stern (1985).

The exquisiteness of reception. Attunement reveals the receptive elaboration of the intensity, shape and timing of affective expressiveness, and occurs largely out of awareness and almost automatically, while empathy requires conscious cognitive mediation. Attunement involves emotional resonance which is recast into another form of expression—a distinct form of affective transaction in its own right, which relates to the intensity, timing and shape of behaviour. Stern's lovely example is illustrative:

A 9-month-old girl becomes very excited about a toy and reaches for it. As she grabs for it she lets out an exuberant 'aaaah!' and looks at her mother. Her mother looks back and scrunches up her shoulders and performs a terrific shimmy with her upper body, like a go-go dancer. The shimmy lasts about as long as her daughter's 'aaaah!' but is equally excited, joyful and intense. (Stern, 1985, p. 140)

Many things are happening in this moment. The expressive tendrils of a child's bodily experiences are recognized, held in a sharing moment by another's body, in another register, and that transformed expression is returned to the child. This is contingency for beginners (Phillips, 1998). Something of the child's experience, which is outside of words, has a material effect on the interpersonal world—her mother—and that reception is conveyed to the child in a different key. The child learns not merely, 'What I do makes a difference' (behavioural contingency) but 'What I experience, express, am-for-a-moment makes a difference' (experiential, receptive contingency). And the proof of that is not only its visible, expressive reception, but its translation into another register, which permits the child to see it again, to see it in a new way, from another's perspective. This provides for the child a non-specular reflective experience of her own bodily experience. She has the opportunity to know the reality of her own bodily and mental experience intersubjectively as much by the senses of proprioception and kinaesthesia.

The child in this moment has the possibility of realizing that her experience can be detected and received, of realizing that there is mutual mentality. Not to put too fine a point on it, perhaps this experience is an affective prototype of moving towards a theory of mind; the pleasure of other minds.

This links nicely with Winnicott's (1945/1988) account of the developmental achievement (and healthy reversibility) of personal integration and of 'personalization', where one comes to feel the reality of one's lived bodily experiences and inner needs. 'It is instinctual experience and the repeated quiet experiences of body care that gradually build up what may be called satisfactory personalization' (p. 151). Phillips (1988) elaborates: 'There is a dawning experience of being a specific person whose particularity is rooted in the body, and which will be elaborated into the sentiment of being who one happens to be' (p. 80). There are vast personality differences in how much trust we come to place on the reality of those inner experiences.

Transient Experiences: Enduring Dispositions

Tomkins' theory addresses how transient affective experiences can become amplified, and (when repetitively interlinked either with each other, or with cognitions) shape enduring dispositions and personality tendencies. Affective personality dispositions render more likely certain kinds of attention and response, and facilitate certain kinds of structuring of thought. They shape how we live in time: via influencing our attention to what's possible now, reflection on the past, and anticipation (McIlwain, 2006). Immersion in positive emotional states promotes perceptual and cognitive activity, note Izard et al. (2000), while negative emotions like fear and anger promote action tendencies. Several experiments show links 'between positive emotions and particular types of thought or information processing ... joy spawns expansive and free-ranging cognition compared to fear, which has virtually the opposite effect' (Izard et al., 2000, p. 21).

The nature of each affect inspires us differently in terms of perception or action. Immersion in pleasurable affects might promote either the pleasurable breakdown of self-world-other distinctions or a balanced experience of self and world; immersion in shame promotes a negative focus on self rather than world. Patterns of attending shape our emotional experience, in that 'attentional selectivity means that one is usually not aware of all aspects of one's occurrent phenomenology' (Lambie & Marcel, 2002, p. 227). Our experience is shaped via our attending to, or attending away from, the experiential phenomena of emotional arousal as well as whether we focus on self or world. Such patterns can become dispositions in their own right and determine how transient experiences can become enduring dispositions.

Selectivity and patterns of attention result from the emotions themselves, but also result from the affective schemas (or inner working models) associated with different attachment styles. Lambie and Marcel (2002) summarize the

literature linking avoidant attachment with more world-focused attention styles, secure attachment with a more balanced self-focused–world-focused style, and ambivalent (or preoccupied) attachment with a more self-focused style of emotional experience.

The nature of the responsive presence of others may influence which affects we recurrently experience, which come to provide the affective anchors of the internal working models that form and are characteristic of differing attachment styles. Relationships to others and attunement may shape how even basic affects impact on us by modulating our patterns of attending to them, influencing how we cope with arousal and regulate our affects. Poor regulation of motivational and emotional arousal has its costs in terms of neural plasticity (Harkness & Tucker, 2000). Unhelpful schemas arise (Warburton & McIlwain, 2005), and ‘insults of emotional deprivation and trauma may lead to the formation of stable depressogenic schemas’ (Harkness & Tucker, 2000, p. 202). Via incorporation into affectively anchored schemas, early relational difficulties shape attention, memory and sense of self. From these affective exchanges arise our (differential) capacities for self-reflection, intersubjective awareness and theory of mind that enable us to appreciate the other as other and to relate uniquely to the world.

Meta-emotions and affective skills. So, an endorsement of basic affects or primary drives does not leave us to stumble through life with identical blueprints unchanged by unique experience like some low-grade Stepford wife. The signature capturing of body, breath and glands promoted by basic affects and drives is only part of the story, influencing our bodily phenomenology and what is potentially retained as our experience. While change in the basic affects is minimal, change can occur via the role that such affects play in other processes—such as where patterns of attending to or being immersed in emotion may be harnessed in skill development. Being emotionally skilled reflects a relation among temporally organized structures assembled in response to the particular requirements of activities or the situation at hand (Izard et al., 2000). Learning results in the idiosyncratic expression of even the basic affects. Though, as Panksepp (2000) notes, ‘the precise manner in which cognitive activities become intermeshed with affective values remains largely unknown’, this ‘is an issue of first importance’ (p. 248).

Precisely such intermeshing of affects and cognitions is implicated in the formation of internal working models, schemas and scripts, where our particular experience of our own needs and pleasures is captured in affective schemas and scripts permeated by cultural mores. Experience of our own bodily pleasures thus might come to owe more to cultural influences, as we develop, than to the body–brain underpinnings. We suffer not from our desires, but from the attitudes we take to our desires (Phillips, 1998). The attitudes we take to our emotions, or meta-emotions (Lambie & Marcel, 2002), are individually and culturally variable, shaped in part by the contingent psycho-affective

history of an individual and in part by the moralities and spiritualities ascendant in local subcultures and the wider culture.

Action Attitudes, Agency and Self-esteem

The capacity to learn to attend away from certain features of our emotional state is theoretically useful in addressing the candidate phenomena Westen (1997) puts in the to-do list of a sound motivational theory. For instance, what is behind the motivation to maintain our self-esteem and our sense of agency and control? A sense of agency and control may arise from what Lambie and Marcel (2002) call the 'action attitude' of an emotion, namely the behavioural and bodily aspects (when self-focused), which provides an 'experienced directness of self ... of an active, agentic kind (which in second-order experience is experienced as "an urge to")' (p. 238). Being able to attend to one's inner processes (the self aspects of emotional experience) may promote a sense of agency and control, the pleasure in successful, joyful acting on the world, or the pleasure of an angry or aggressive resumption of control after the sudden loss of control that is shame.

We can also have emotions and attitudes towards our occurrent emotions and yearnings. Over and above self-reflexive emotions, we can have emotions about emotions. Shame is a feeling about feelings (Lansky & Morrison, 1997), a feeling about other longings that we have: for dependency, for being unique, admired and loved. Machiavellians may feel filled with fear when/if they momentarily experience trust. The felt motivation to protect self-esteem arises, perhaps, not from a separate motive system but out of the fact that many emotions become self-reflective in their focus. That we can then have emotions about having emotions (the self-reflective or meta-emotion features of our emotional experiences) means that we can feel the full array of emotions *about* occurrent emotions. These nested emotion–emotion patterns were central to Tomkins' interests. Let's see how they might play themselves out in the contemporary literature.

Contemporary Case Studies

The cascading developmental constraints arising from idiosyncrasies in direct and vicarious affective experience are an exciting new path emerging in the contemporary literature.

(1) *Shame–fear: shame–anger.* Izard et al. (2000, pp. 23–29) offer a case study of the way that shame can be co-assembled with other affects. To trace for a moment their line of reasoning: in the contemporary operationalization of narcissism, if we defensively love ourselves rather more than we can realistically and contingently justify (call it unrealistic high self-esteem or grandiosity), then if we are shamed we will aggress (Bushman & Baumeister,

1998). 'In so far as violence increases dominance over others it decreases sources of shame' (Izard et al., 2000, p. 28). By increasing dominance over others, aggression may enable one to regain a sense of control that, Izard et al. suggest, was suddenly lost in the experience of shame, where one feels oneself 'as an object of contempt and thus feels belittled ... coupled with a heightened state of self-awareness' (p. 24). Early emotional abuse is likely to promote these shame-anger links (Hoglund & Nicholas, 1995). Conversely, shame may result in fear, resulting in chronic withdrawal such as social anxiety or social phobia (Izard et al., 2000). If, rather than being narcissistic, we merely have a low sense of our self-worth (feeling disgust or contempt towards ourselves), then, Izard et al. suggest, if we are shamed we will withdraw (Harter & Jackson, 1993). Many boys 'are taught to feel ashamed of being afraid' (Izard et al., 2000, p. 26). This illustrates an important nested variant of the affect-affect links that so interested Tomkins, and that Izard (and his colleagues) show must be taken seriously to understand how shame might play itself out differently in different personalities, depending on the psycho-affective history of each person.

Many phenomena of interest to personality psychologists arise from drive-affect-emotion connections—connections that arise somewhat idiosyncratically and contingently in the course of life experience and explicit socialization. Owing to cascading constraints, some developmental paths are closed off, others made more likely. This may result in signature patterns of development for particular personality styles.

(2) *Without fear or vicarious distress.* For psychopaths, another's distress cues have no clout (Blair, 1995, 2001), recognition of fearful and sad facial (and vocal) expressions are suboptimal relative to non-psychopathic comparison groups (Blair, Colledge, Murray, & Mitchell, 2001; Blair et al., 2002), and moral discernment suffers (Blair, 1995). Kochanska's work (1993, 1994) indicates that children's fearfulness contributes to the establishment of shame, guilt and empathy. If psychopaths are not born but made, we know that they are made very early. Blair's evidence suggests they are at least in part born due to a selective difficulty with emotions linked to the functioning of the amygdala, or certainly very early-acquired affective deficits revealing a 'callous unemotionality' (Saltaris, 2002). There is a relevant developmental story to be told. Even with biological predispositions like amygdala dysfunction, the knock-on effects of a lack of fear (and a lack of sensitivity to fear and sadness in others) need to be spelled out. Different parenting styles are required to socialize fearless vs fearful children (Blair et al., 2001, p. 492). Viding (2004) notes, however, that 'inadequate parenting, a known marker for anti-social behaviour in children, has less of an impact on children with psychopathic tendencies' (p. 1331).

(3) *Attenuated direct (and vicarious) emotional experience and expression.* Machiavellians famously have the 'cool syndrome'. Their capacity to manipulate and exploit others (against those others' own interest) is made possible either by diminished emotional experience and signalling of emotion, or by a

lack of either hot or cold empathy. They have neither the warm, bodily resonating empathy, nor the cold, more cognitive, perspective-taking variety of empathy (McIlwain, 2003). Controlled or diminished affective displays make deception possible; lack of empathy makes exploitation possible. A lack of empathy suggests there is no reason *not* to exploit others—it doesn't give a positive account of the motivation. Some further story needs to be told about where this impulse to exploit and harm comes from. Blair's work only addresses why this impulse to violence is not inhibited (Blair, 1995, p. 11).

(4) *Sadism and malignant aggression*. Retaining the drives matters, since the developmental course of their organization and expression is relevant to malignant aggression, sadism and the excited or callous exploitation of others of a number of the personality styles sparking contemporary research interest. To exploit those who are unaware of being manipulated has sadistic components. In some literatures this is seen as perverse, where suffering of another may result in excitement rather than compassion. Such drive/affect interactions are addressed by Fromm's (1973) account of malignant aggression (which he saw not as a primary drive, but as a 'character drive'). Malignant aggression is a motivational pattern that may arise where deficiencies in the experience of fear rule it out as a potential candidate for co-assembly with sex drives or with aggression. The sex drives may thus retain a more perverse organization (perhaps co-assembled with aggression) that may reveal itself as pleasure in or excitement at the suffering of others, and complexities in the personal experience of pain. Profiling the development of signature, motivational tendencies of Machiavellians and psychopaths is in its infancy, though Cleckley's (1941/1988) original clinical work provides support.

Affective Personality Dispositions

Attunement, attachment experiences and affective exchanges shape the co-assembly of affects, as well as the capacity fully to experience the reality of one's own inner states. Quite different affective personality dispositions arise depending on whether one's longing and neediness have been met with interest and joyful engagement or with shame. Mastery, control over the world, over our affective displays, over our openness to interpersonal sharing of affect, to vicariously tuning into the affect of another—all are shaped by the specificity of our bodily drives and affects, and the specific nature of their reception intersubjectively. This reception shapes our patterns of attending to personal emotional experience as well as our empathic receptivity to others. The personality styles discussed here may have endured early childhood situations where it was not safe to have full direct experience and expression of affect, and this may be linked to individuals' control of their expressive displays, their tendency to avoid showing need, and avoid drawing close in a trusting way to others. Phillips (1998) suggests that humiliation arises when we experience our own inevitable needs as a tyranny. And for Machiavellians,

psychopaths and narcissists, there is a story to be told around humiliation, shame and the ensuing contempt, covert and unscrupulous use of power or even outright aggression, as a welter of contemporary evidence shows.

These case studies show the utility of including drives and affects within a model of motivation illustrating the role played by highly specific, idiosyncratic templates for pleasures in shaping what certain personalities want and enjoy. They illustrate the way that early socialization experiences or deficits in the range and intensity of such experiences may form the basis of cascading constraints in development, limiting the capacity to experience and honour others as others in their own right. Without fear, sexuality may acquire (or retain) a perverse, sadistic organization—concern or empathy may not arise, and normative morality may never develop. This account does not detail how the absence of a rich experience of a full array of affects hinders a full theory of mind, self-reflective function, and perhaps the self-reflective emotions so important to the development of morality. It merely suggests that, without an overarching, positively valued sense of self, integration of the disparate drives and affects may be impaired. A lean, mean motivational model which includes the early Freud's view of drives and Tomkins' model of affects is not the full story, but to return to its richness now is better than tacitly and uncritically assuming affects are fine, but 'no drives please'. Such a move leaves us wanting as theorists and researchers. Freud and Tomkins never excluded drives as part of the story, and there seems to be no evidential basis for us to do so now.

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